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1 Introduction 
Estimating and verifying any gender gap in the division of housework among children
1
 in 
Vietnam could help explain, among other things, a number of family decisions, including 
gender preferences. After controlling for any difference in genetic endowments arising from 
marriage contracts or working for market or home production, the gender gap, if it exists, 
could capture the comparative advantage of gender. Moreover, the identified lexicographic 
preference for a son in Vietnam (Vu, 2012) poses other questions concerning the rationale 
and consistency of parental behavior. For instance, if daughters are more likely to be involved 
in housework
2
 and do more housework than sons, daughters become relatively more valuable. 
In addition, by shedding light on the gender gap in housework, we can usefully explore the 
notion of altruism among siblings and their parents. 
The purpose of this study is to estimate the gender gap in the division of housework 
among the children of household heads with single marital status who continue to reside in 
the family home. There is some complexity in this question in that any gender gap in 
housework potentially includes both the probability of undertaking housework and the time 
spent on housework. First, we examine the gender gap across children of household heads in 
one-child families. Then we compare the gender gap across two-child families and across 
twins in multiple-child families using twin data. We develop two scenarios—independent and 
mutual decision-making—to estimate the gender gap according to the order of birth, sex 
composition, age, altruism among siblings, and the inspiration for housework by a parent of 
the same gender. We use the Heckman sample selection model to deal with censored data in 
the independent decision-making scenario and a first-difference technique to validate the 
gender gap in the time spent on housework when using the twin data. Subsequently, we 
employ a bivariate probit model and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to analyze the 
simultaneous decision-making process among siblings in two-child families. 
Our work contributes to the gender gap literature in several respects. Of these, the most 
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 Throughout our analysis, we use ‘children’ to denote the children of any age of household heads. Therefore, 
children do not necessarily mean young persons. 
2
 By the nature of the data employed in this analysis, housework by the children of the household heads 
comprises purely ‘chores’ (see the description in Section 4). As explained in ILO (2002, p. 30), children engaged 
in domestic chores within their own household are not considered economically active. Therefore, housework by 
the children of the household heads, as in our study, is by definition, not a form of child labor as conventionally 
defined. 
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important is that, to the best of our knowledge, this analysis is the first to address the division 
of housework among siblings using twin data to deal with any difference in genetic 
endowment. The paper also examines mutual decision-making patterns as a complementary 
method. Thus, we are able to correct for any bias caused by any difference in endowment 
among individuals and thereby to verify the presence of altruism among siblings and their 
parents. 
Overall, the results indicate a mixed gender gap, evidence of support from a sister to her 
sibling and the inspiration from mother to daughter on the time spent on housework. For 
females, the gender gap accounts for a 0.249–0.437 higher probability of undertaking any 
housework with the magnitude of the difference in housework over males of some 9.66 to 
17.94 minutes a day. In two-child families, a daughter who has a brother has the largest 
gender gap in terms of housework. However, once we control for genetic endowment, male–
female twins spend approximately the same amount of time on housework. Analysis of 
mutual decision-making in two-child families indicates that elder daughters would shoulder 
housework for the other siblings. The reverse holds for two-child families with a younger 
daughter, but only where the children are 20 years of age or younger. In addition, we find that 
besides sharing the family housework load, one minute spent on housework by the mother 
inspires a 0.0481–0.298 minute increase in the time spent on housework by her daughter. 
However, this relation is statistically insignificant where the siblings are again 20 years of 
age or younger. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related studies 
concerning the division of housework. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology, and 
Section 4 details the data used. Section 5 discusses the findings and Section 6 provides our 
conclusion. 
2 Related literature 
The hours spent on housework and working by individuals in families are often examined to 
identify the substitution between market production, home production (for low-income 
households), and housework (purely chores). In a collective labor supply model, the sharing 
rule of housework can act as an instrument to estimate the bargaining power of the husband 
and wife (Chiappori, 1988, 1992; Browning et al., 1998; Blundell et al., 2007). Hersch and 
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Stratton (2002) indicate a gender gap between males and females as housework has a 
negative effect on wages, regardless of marital status. More specifically, husbands do less 
housework than wives do when their relative earnings and workload increase (Hersch and 
Stratton, 1994). 
There have been several arguments used to explain the gender gap in housework between 
husbands and their wives. Becker (1985) claims the responsibility of married women for 
childrearing and housework has major implications for the differences in earnings and 
occupation between men and women. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) suggest that the growing 
inequality in leisure between males and females is the mirror image of the growing inequality 
in male and female wages and expenditure. Further, an important component of the division 
of housework relies on gender effects, such as the cultural context or the historical 
perspective on the division of housework, rather than on any spousal differences in 
observable characteristics (Alvarez and Miles, 2003). 
However, other studies in child labor partially examine the mechanism to divide tasks 
within households. Conventionally, child labor comprises children aged 5–17 years involved 
in economic activity but excluding children 12 years and older working only a few hours a 
week in permitted light work and those 15 years and older whose work is not classified as 
“hazardous” (ILO, 2002). Where the adult wage is high, children do not work (Basu and Van, 
1998) and thus improvements in household wealth can explain about 80 percent of the 
decline in the incidence of child labor (Edmonds, 2005). However, when parents and children 
are altruistic, an increase in parental income need not always lead to a decrease in child labor 
(Rogers and Swinnerton, 2004). For example, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) argue that 
daughters shoulder a larger proportion of housework than do sons when the expected 
employment of women in the labor market is relatively high. Therefore, there is a significant 
interaction between adult and child labor, but they can be either substitutes or complements 
(Ray, 2000). In subsequent work, Edmonds (2006) suggests that in Nepal, any difference 
could arise because of the comparative advantage of birth order as well as gender bias toward 
specific types of work. Examining household data from Nicaragua and Guatemala, Dammert 
(2010) concludes sons are more associated with market work while the time allocation for 
daughters is more sensitive to domestic work. 
In terms of the gender preference for children, the majority of studies show that parents 
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favor the rearing of sons. For instance, in rural Punjab in India, the female mortality rate is in 
fact higher than the corresponding rate for males aged from one to 59 months, despite a 
naturally higher neonatal male mortality rate (Das Gupta, 1987). Similarly, Pande (2003) 
evidences a gender difference that provides disadvantages to daughters in childhood nutrition 
and immunization. In particular, Lin and Adsera (2012) suggest that daughters could be 
loaded with anywhere from one to three hours more housework per week where the son has a 
higher perceived value. 
Apart from bargaining power and the nature of the marriage contract, differences in 
endowment could be one of a number of possible causes for difference in the tasks loaded on 
family members. Using a twin sample, Behrman et al. (1994) claims that 27 percent of the 
variance in log earnings is because of variability in individual-specific endowments. In 
addition, Picard and Wolff (2010) argue that 40 percent of the total inequality in education is 
mainly because of differences between families, while the differences within families are 
smaller and rather more difficult to explain. Dammert (2010) claims that twin data, if 
available, would help to minimize any bias in the estimation of the gender gap. 
Meanwhile, empirical research on the family division of housework has not yet fully 
examined simultaneous decision-making among siblings. It is likely because of data 
limitations that previous studies in this area neglect the influence of one sibling over another. 
For instance, Ray (2000) pools children aged 6–17 (10–17) in Peru (Pakistan) and therefore is 
unable to examine the mutual decision-making process in housework. That said, while 
children less than 5 years of age may not do any housework, we argue that they can 
nevertheless influence the housework load of their elder siblings and their parents. For 
example, Rapoport et al. (2011) finds the presence of very young children in the family 
increases both paternal market work and total work. Likewise, Evertsson (2006) shows that 
girls and boys in two-parent families are more likely to engage in gender atypical work the 
more the parent of the same sex engages in this kind of work. However, Evertsson does not 
construct an interaction between the gender of the child and the hours of housework by the 
parent (other sibling) with the same gender. In other work, Dammert (2010) documents a 
gender gap by birth order for market and domestic work in which elder boys spend more time 
in both, while elder girls experience only more domestic work. However, Dammert (2010) 
does not overcome the problems of sample selection and endogeneity in family 
decision-making. 
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Although the nature of housework in the data we use is not child labor, we recognize that 
several existing studies report the spectacular decline in child labor in Vietnam during the 
1990s. For example, Rosati and Tzannatos (2006) find a sharp increase in enrolment rates in 
primary and lower-secondary education for both girls and boys in Vietnam between 1993 and 
1998, at the same time as the gender gap in enrolment rates and working narrowed. For 
instance, approximately 75.1 (75.7) percent of girls (boys) attended school without work 
tasks, while 15.4 (17.1) percent of girls (boys) undertook both work and schooling in 1998. 
As one explanation, Edmonds and Turk (2004) assert a strong correlation between 
improvements in living standards and child labor in Vietnam, finding the decrease in child 
labor is most dramatic in provincial towns, minor cities, the southeast, and the rural Mekong 
River delta. However, new household business establishments would correlate with smaller 
declines in child labor though households containing home business in 1993 enjoy larger 
decrease in child labor than others (Edmonds and Turk, 2004). Lastly, Edmonds and Pavcnik 
(2005b) argue that the increase in rice prices can explain 45 percent of the decrease in child 
labor in rural Vietnam in the 1990s. 
3 Data selection 
The data we employ are from the Household Living Standard and Consumer Price Index 
Survey 2008, commonly known as Vietnamese Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) 
2008. VHLSS 2008 is one wave of the Living Standards Measurement Surveys technically 
supported by the World Bank and undertaken nationwide by the General Statistic Office of 
Vietnam. The sample size is 45,945 households or 289,948 individuals. We primarily base 
the analysis on the responses to Questions 26 and 27 in Section 4A of VHLSS 2008. In the 
first question, individuals respond on whether they have to do housework, such as cleaning, 
shopping, cooking, washing clothes, water and wood fetching, and repairing tools. If they do, 
the next question is how many hours per day in the last 12 months the respondents undertook 
these kinds of task on average (GSO, 2008). 
From the original data, we investigate individuals whose relationship to the household 
head are ‘children’ and divide the data by several other control criteria. To guarantee the 
selected child and the household head are truly blood relations, we limit the sample to parents 
whose children are all single in terms of marital status. In addition, if they have siblings, all 
siblings must have the same family name. We split our data into two sets. We select the first 
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set based on the number of siblings in the family without any age limit. We then set an age 
limit of 20 years and younger to reduce the effect of the labor market on the division of 
housework. The second set of data concerns twins. We construct this by selecting only those 
households in which one child of the household head has the same month and year of birth as 
a sibling. As the siblings are both children of the same household head, single in marital 
status, reside in the same household, and have the same month and year of birth, they are very 
likely twins. The twin data comprise 1,000 twins (or 500 pairs of twins). 
<INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE> 
We also examine the children of household heads in one- and two-child families across 
two age selections: all child ages and children less than 21 years of age. In one-child families, 
the decision of the family concerning child housework does not logically influence that for 
another child, because there is only one child. However, in two-child families, we can 
examine the interaction between the elder child and the younger child within and across 
families. The estimates for the two-child families are also comparable with those for the twin 
data. 
We argue that the notion of housework as defined and obtained from VHLSS 2008 is 
neither home production nor market production, and obviously different from the description 
of child labor as defined by the ILO (2002). As shown in Tables 1 and 2, only about 47.5–
52.1 percent of the children of household heads engage in housework, with a mean of roughly 
1.5 hours per day and a standard deviation of approximately 0.8 hours. Consequently, 
approximately 95 percent of children undertake less than 3 hours of housework each day, and 
this is commensurately less likely to represent child labor as traditionally defined
3
. That could 
hold even when the responders to the questionnaire misunderstand the question and 
erroneously refer to economic activity as housework in the questionnaire. 
We acknowledge that our data and sample selection method involve some limitations. First, 
the duration of housework may not be an appropriate indicator of the gender gap in 
housework between siblings. For example, the hours of housework do not necessarily 
indicate the quality of work, as a better-performing sibling may be able to complete the work 
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 Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005a) aggregate child labor data for children aged 5–14 years from 33 countries in 
2000 and show that these children undertake approximately 26.1 and 15.8 hours per week on average in market 
and domestic work, respectively. 
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required in a shorter time. The types of housework for males and females may also differ, and 
this could result in different durations. Second, the housework information does not specify 
the task, so we are unable to have any insight on the type of housework in which males 
(females) are involved. Third, the twin data do not guarantee all individuals are identical 
twins, through which we can control perfectly for any difference in endowment. Finally, we 
may exclude some children of the household head that live away from home, and this could 
account for the incorrect control of family size and birth order. 
Nevertheless, we argue that our use of the duration of housework and the household and 
twin data help in this regard. First, we assume that the variance between efficient and 
less-efficient housework is unlikely to be longer than one hour. This should also hold with the 
time gap across housework tasks. Second, the twin data and two-child family data are 
comparable. To start with, no children of the household heads in the selected data are married. 
Further, the respective mean age and standard deviation of age in two-child families are 
11.225 and 5.356 and these are very close to those for the twin data, as shown in Table 2. 
Third, unlike market production where the training in skills is by a certified school and/or 
system of training, housework requires simple skills and informal training, often by parents. 
Therefore, selecting individuals that are siblings, of the same age, with the same father, and 
brought up in the same family, should sufficiently control for any difference in endowments 
in undertaking housework. Finally, as we consider only siblings residing in the same 
household, the division of housework across siblings is valid and efficient despite errors, if 
any, associated with an incorrect birth order. 
4 Empirical models and specification 
4.1 Heckman sample selection for the probability and duration of housework 
We assume decisions on housework are in two steps using a Heckman sample selection 
model. We can apply this method to the pooled data on the children of household heads in 
one- and two-child families and among twins. In the selection stage, 𝑧𝑖𝑗  is the utility 
function of child 𝑖 in family 𝑗. We cannot calculate 𝑧 but are able to observe 𝑧’ which is 
whether the individual is obliged to undertake housework or not. In the outcome stage, if the 
individual does undertake housework, the time duration 𝑦𝑖𝑗 will be determined. 
In the selection stage,  
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𝑧′𝑖𝑗  = 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗 = {
1,  𝑖𝑓𝑧𝑖𝑗 = 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝐶𝑗𝛾 + 𝜀 ≥ 𝑧
∗
0,  𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖𝑗 < 𝑧
∗ 
.   (1) 
In the outcome stage,  
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝑊′𝑖𝑗𝛼
′ + 𝑋′𝑖𝑗𝛽′ + 𝐶′𝑗 + 𝜖,     (2) 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑗 is the gender gap/sex composition by birth order. Gender gap is a dummy and 
denoted as sex. 𝑆𝑒𝑥 = 1 if the child is female. Sex composition is a family set of genders 
by birth order. We deploy sex composition by birth order similar to Vu (2012). For example, 
𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑦𝑖𝑛𝐵𝐵 means 𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑦𝑖𝑛𝐵𝐵 = 1 if the individual is the elder son in a two-son family; 
𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑦𝑖𝑛𝐵𝐵 = 0 otherwise. 𝑏𝑜𝑦𝑖𝑛𝐺𝐵 means 𝑏𝑜𝑦𝑖𝑛𝐺𝐵 = 1 if the individual is the son in a 
two-child family with the eldest a female child; otherwise 𝑏𝑜𝑦𝑖𝑛𝐺𝐵 = 0. 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a vector of 
individual characteristics, including age, education, school enrollment, and being on school 
vacation at the time of the survey. 𝐶𝑗 is a vector of control variables for family background 
and characteristics, including the log of annual household income adjusted by the square root 
of household size (𝑙ℎℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑐), hours doing housework for the individuals’ parents 
( 𝐻ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝐼  for fathers, 𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝐼  for mothers), interaction term between 
gender of the child and time spent on housework by a parent of the same gender 
(𝐵𝐻ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝐼  for sons and fathers, 𝐺𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝐼  for daughters and mothers), 
along with dummies for a family’s servant (ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟), single parents (𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡), urban 
region (𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛), household appliances (freezer, washing machine, gas cooker, rice cooker, 
vacuum cleaner, and microwave oven) and living space per capita (𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑐). 
4.2 Mutual decision-making process 
Although Heckman sample selection enables the estimates for the one- and two-child families 
and twin data to be comparable, it would be interesting to know the impact of mutual 
decision-making on housework for siblings in two-child families. A bivariate probit model is 
suitable for the mutual decision-making in the first step. Subsequently, SUR analysis is 
appropriate for the outcome step when both siblings undertake housework, as there should be 
a sharing rule in place. The specifications for each case are as follows. 
In the bivariate probit model, we assume that the decisions on whether to undertake 
housework of the siblings in a two-child family are mutual. Any one child also takes the 
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characteristics of their sibling into consideration. The utility function 𝑦1𝑗
∗  consists of the 
gender of the individual (𝑠𝑒𝑥1𝑗), the characteristics of the individual (X1j), the characteristics 
of the corresponding sibling (𝑠𝑒𝑥2𝑗 , 𝑋2𝑗 ) and the other characteristics of the family (𝐶𝑗). 𝑋1𝑗, 
𝑋2𝑗 and 𝐶𝑗 can be specified similarly to the states in the Heckman sample selection model. 
The probability of undertaking housework by the first child in family 𝑗 and the second child 
in family 𝑘 can then be specified in two separate equations, as follows. 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1𝑗 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1𝑗
∗ = 𝑠𝑒𝑥1𝑗𝛼1
𝑗 + 𝑠𝑒𝑥2𝑗𝛼2
𝑗 + 𝑋1𝑗𝛽1
𝑗 + 𝑋2𝑗𝛽2
𝑗 + 𝐶𝑗𝛾 + 𝑢1𝑗 ≥ 𝑧
∗
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1𝑗
∗ < 𝑧1𝑗
∗  (3) 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2𝑘 = {
1,  𝑖𝑓 𝑦2𝑘
∗ = 𝑠𝑒𝑥1𝑘𝛼1
𝑘 + 𝑠𝑒𝑥2𝑘𝛼2
𝑘 + 𝑋1𝑘𝛽1
𝑘 + 𝑋2𝑘𝛽2
𝑘 + 𝐶𝑘𝛾 + 𝑢2𝑘 ≥ 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2𝑘
∗ < 𝑧2𝑘
∗   (4) 
In a different family (𝑗 ≠ 𝑘), these same decisions are made independently, such that 
corr(𝑢1𝑗, 𝑢2𝑘) = 0 . However, within a family ( 𝑗 = 𝑘 ), these decisions are made 
simultaneously based on an unobservable sharing rule 𝜇𝑗, which can be applied to both 
siblings, such that 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢1𝑗 , 𝑢2𝑗) = 𝜌 ≠ 0. 
𝑢1𝑗 = 𝜔. 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜖1𝑗          (5) 
𝑢2𝑗 = 𝜑. 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜖2𝑗         (6) 
Removing the sharing rule implies there are no correlated elements between (5) and (6) or 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜖1𝑗, 𝜖2𝑗) = 0 . Therefore, the residuals of (3) and (4) follow a bivariate probit 
distribution, such that 𝑢1𝑗, 𝑢1𝑗~∅2(0,0,1,1, 𝜌). 
In the SUR, we assume both siblings in the same family take the characteristics of the 
other sibling into account in their own decisions. Similarly, an unobservable sharing rule 
appears in the residuals of the equations for both the first and second child of the same 
family. 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒1𝑗 = 𝑠𝑒𝑥1𝑗𝛼1
𝑗 + 𝑠𝑒𝑥2𝑗𝛼2
𝑗 + 𝑋1𝑗𝛽1
𝑗 + 𝑋2𝑗𝛽2
𝑗 + 𝐶𝑗𝛾 + 𝑢1𝑗   (7) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑘  = 𝑠𝑒𝑥1𝑘𝛼1
𝑘 + 𝑠𝑒𝑥2𝑘𝛼2
𝑘 + 𝑋1𝑘𝛽1
𝑘 + 𝑋2𝑘𝛽2
𝑘 + 𝐶𝑘𝛾 + 𝑢2𝑘   (8) 
corr(𝑢1𝑗 , 𝑢2𝑘) = 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 corr(𝑢1𝑗 , 𝑢2𝑘) ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑘   (9) 
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The specification is the same as the bivariate probit model. Consequently, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢1𝑗 , 𝑢2𝑗) 
should help us to gather some information from the counter equation in the SUR. 
4.3 First-difference technique for analyzing the gender gap in the twin data 
The twin data and the first-difference technique can help overcome any endogeneity problem 
that the analysis employing Heckman sample selection may contain. In the twin data, two 
children of the household head have the same year of birth, month of birth, and family name. 
Therefore, it is likely that they have almost the same endowment and family background. 
Therefore, we can eliminate the difference in endowment as well as consider each family 
separately. In addition, the first-difference technique concerning the duration of housework in 
the twin data can help verify the results of the previous analysis. 
Apart from the difference in housework by gender (𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑥), if any, the only other 
difference between a pair of twins should be school enrolment (𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑙) and being on school 
vacation (𝑑𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑐). We represent the difference in the hours of housework by: 
𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑗 = [𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒1𝑗 − 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑗] = 𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑗 ∗ 𝛽 + 𝑑𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑗 ∗ 𝛼 + 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑗 ∗ 𝛾 + 𝐶𝑗 ∗ 𝛿 +
𝜀𝑗,          (10) 
where 𝐶𝑗 is specified as in the preceding model to control for any differences across families. 
5 Results 
The results indicate a significant gender gap in the probability of doing housework regardless 
of the relation to the household head, birth order, number of siblings, age and endowment 
difference. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the positive and statistically significant value of sex 
indicates that a female has a higher probability of undertaking housework across all families 
in all cases. In fact, the gender gap alone explains the 0.249–0.600 higher probability of 
undertaking housework for females. After controlling for any difference in endowment in the 
twin analysis, a probability of 0.437 is a more exact estimation of the gender gap, as shown in 
column (10) in Table 4. After considering mutual decision-making in two-child families, the 
housework gender gap for the eldest child is 8.61 percent higher than the younger one in 
two-child families, as shown in Table 7. However, for children under 21 years of age, the 
gender gap is 2.58 percent lower for the elder sibling in two-child families. As such, the 
increased probability of undertaking housework by the eldest child does not depend on the 
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gender of the second child as in columns (1) and (3) of Table 7. However, the youngest child 
has a lower probability of undertaking housework if the sibling is female. This is likely one 
probable cause of the large gender gap found when the first child is female. 
<INSERT TABLES 3, 4, 5 AND 6 HERE> 
We also find a significant gender gap in the duration of housework across birth order 
among children of the household head, as shown in Tables 3, 4 and 8. In Table 4, a daughter 
undertakes 17.94 minutes more housework a day than an equivalent son does, although the 
gap could be up to 36.36 minutes for any female in any family in a typical day, as shown in 
Table 3. Similarly, 9.66 minutes is the lowest instance we find of the housework gender gap 
among siblings, where all of the children are less than 21 years of age and residing in 
two-child families. Examining the mutual decision of the time spent on housework in Table 8, 
we find that the eldest female child in two-child families undertakes anywhere from 10.62 to 
14.22 minutes more housework than the eldest male. 
<INSERT TABLES 7 AND 8 HERE> 
However, once we control for endowment in the twin data, the gender gap of the time 
spent on housework is negligible, as shown in column (9) in Table 4. The first-difference 
analysis using the twin data confirms this finding of a negligible housework gender gap. As 
reported in Table 9, the gender difference is not statistically significant and as such cannot 
possibly explain the difference in the number of hours doing housework for twins in 
two-child families, although the adjusted R-squared increases in value to 0.5056 or higher. 
Other factors, such as the difference in schooling enrollment, and/or differences in being on 
school vacation, could then better account for the difference in the duration of housework. If 
schooling enrollment were the main reason for the difference in time spent on housework for 
twins, it is reasonable to argue that the difference in school enrollment for twins already 
contains either the discrimination and/or misfortune of one of the twins. However, we are 
unable to arrive at a definite explanation given the available data. 
<INSERT TABLE 9 HERE> 
The estimations in Table 6 examine sex composition by birth order in two-child families. 
This result concurs with Dammert (2010) and Edmonds (2006) in the presence of a 
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housework gender gap by birth order, putting aside differences in method and data. All other 
things being equal, a sister faces the largest gender gap in housework, as she is both more 
likely to undertake housework up to 14.28 minutes longer in a typical day than if she were the 
youngest son in a 𝐵𝐵 (boy only) family. An elder daughter in a 𝐺𝐺 (daughter only) family 
also has a higher probability of undertaking housework and for longer than in a 𝐵𝐵 (son 
only) family. Dammert (2010) likewise concludes that having younger sisters does not reduce 
the burden of domestic work. That is also relevant to our study of 𝐺𝐺  families. The 
corresponding younger daughter in a 𝐺𝐺 family does housework of the same duration as the 
younger son in a 𝐵𝐵 (son only) family. However, she is at higher risk of being involved in 
housework in the first instance. Meanwhile, in a two-child family with a son and a daughter, 
the younger son in a 𝐺𝐵 (daughter–son) family would be the same as a younger son in a 𝐵𝐵 
(son only) family. Unlike Edmonds (2006), our results indicate that an elder son in a 𝐵𝐺 
(son–daughter) family has a higher probability of being involved in housework, but of the 
same duration as a younger son in a 𝐵𝐵 (son only) family. Lastly, unlike Dammert (2010), 
our estimations indicate that daughters in 𝐵𝐺  (son–daughter) and 𝐺𝐵  (daughter–son) 
families are the most likely participants in housework. A daughter in a 𝐺𝐵 (daughter–son) 
family is slightly more likely to undertake housework than one in a 𝐵𝐺 (son–daughter) 
family, but would do less hours of housework than her counterpart. 
There is some evidence of altruism between siblings and this varies by the age of the 
sibling. When we do not control for age, there is a sharing of housework from the elder 
daughter to the younger, but not in the reverse, as indicated by the corresponding gender 
effect of one sibling to another shown in Table 7. We can infer similar outcomes from the 
effect of 𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑙2 (the state of being at school of the younger sibling). However, altruism in 
the reverse direction appears in more highly educated younger siblings, as 𝑒𝑑𝑢2 in (1) in 
Table 7 is negative and statistically significant. The value in the same row in column (3) 
supports this argument. In addition, SUR analysis of the duration of housework in Table 8 
again supports our argument for almost the same corresponding variables. For instance, as in 
the bivariate probit analysis, the sign and statistical significance of 𝑠𝑒𝑥1 in (2) or (4), the 
statistical insignificance of 𝑠𝑒𝑥2 in (1), and the statistical significance of 𝑠𝑒𝑥2 in (3), 
confirm our earlier interpretation. In addition, as shown in Table 8, an inverse altruism arises 
when both siblings are less than 21 years of age, as indicated by the corresponding 
coefficients of 𝑠𝑒𝑥1 and 𝑠𝑒𝑥2 in (4) and (3). 
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We also find that mothers inspire their daughters in housework, unlike fathers and their 
sons. Table 5 suggests a positive significant interaction between the hours of housework by 
the mother and the gender of the child (female) when child age is not controlled. In the twin 
data, the influence of the mother is significantly stronger than in one- and two-child families. 
In all likelihood, the twin data allow us to remove the effect of birth order and the age gap 
between siblings which would lower the corresponding coefficients. However, this interaction 
is not statistically significant for siblings less than 21 years of age. In contrast, the variation 
between the hours of housework by the father and his son is statistically insignificant in all 
cases. Therefore, the results only partially agree with those in Evertsson (2006). 
6 Conclusion 
This paper examined the gender gap in housework among children of household heads based 
on the patterns of both separate and mutual decision-making. In general, the results show that 
females are more likely to undertake housework. However, daughters are not always the 
losers in the chore war. This is because the estimation using the twin data shows that if both 
the son and the daughter are involved in housework, the daughter spends the same amount of 
time on housework as if she were male. In addition, there is clear evidence of altruism in 
housework from an elder sister to her sibling, though the reverse is statistically significant for 
siblings less than 21 years of age.  
Evidence of a gender gap in the probability of housework among twins implies that 
daughters are likely to be guided toward housework. In Vietnam, it is likely that daughters are 
taught to be aware of their own femininity and to fulfill social norms concerning womanly 
virtues. These virtues, also part of Confucianism, relate to morality, proper speech, modest 
manner, and diligent work. Diligent work implies good-performing house workers. Hence, 
our finding agrees with suggestions made by Alvarez and Miles (2003), Dammert (2010), and 
Lin and Adsera (2012). 
However, the insignificant gender gap in the duration of housework in the twin data 
provides an alternative argument concerning the altruism of parents. In all likelihood, parents 
treat daughters and sons differently in terms of their decisions on housework. However, they 
would fairly assign tasks to their sons and daughters. Moreover, the negative relation between 
attending school and housework/hours of housework suggests that parents keep children out 
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of housework and require less housework if the children are in school. However, whether 
housework affects school enrollment remains ambiguous when using these data, although if 
housework hours per day are far from the sample mean, it may indeed be the case. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for children of household heads in one-child families 
 
Variables Descriptions Obs. Mean SD 
select 1 if do housework, 0 otherwise 4,164 0.521  0.500  
time hours spent on housework in a day 2,168 1.534  0.806  
age in years 6,167 11.779  6.150  
sex 1 if female, 0 if male 6,167 0.417  0.493  
edu years of schooling 5,271 6.166  4.539  
atscl 1 if attending any school, 0 otherwise 5,271 0.646  0.478  
onvac 1 if on school vacation at time of survey, 0 otherwise 6,167 0.294  0.456  
WhouseworkII hours spent on housework by the mother 5,033 2.473  1.128  
HhouseworkII  hours spent on housework by the father 3,519 1.592  0.837  
lhhincomesqrpc logarithm of annual household income adjusted by 
squared number of household size 
5,269 9.793  0.720  
helper 1 if hire a housemaid, 0 otherwise 6,167 0.018  0.132  
singleparent 1 if one-parent family, 0 otherwise 6,167 0.148  0.355  
urban 1 if resides in urban region, 0 otherwise 6,167 0.277  0.448  
underseven 1 if the child is less than 7 years old, 0 otherwise 6,167 0.252  0.434  
freezer 1 if have freezer, 0 otherwise 6,130 0.293  0.455  
washing 1 if have washing machine, 0 otherwise 6,130 0.116  0.320  
gascooker 1 if have gas cooker, 0 otherwise 6,130 0.454  0.498  
ricecooker 1 if have rice cooker, 0 otherwise 6,130 0.706  0.456  
vacuum 1 if have vacuum cleaner, 0 otherwise 6,130 0.011  0.106  
microwave 1 if have microwave oven, 0 otherwise 6,130 0.025  0.156  
areapc living space per capita in square meters 5,254 20.431  11.986  
Children of household heads are less than 21 years of age with single marital status. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for children of household heads in two-child families and for 
twins 
 
 Two-child families Twins 
Variables Obs. Mean SD. Obs. Mean SD. 
select 19,612 0.475  0.499  604 0.505  0.500  
time 9,319 1.465  0.796  305 1.489  0.835  
age 33,053 11.225  5.356  1,000 12.958  6.424  
sex 33,053 0.446  0.497  1,000 0.500  0.500  
edu 23,409 6.009  4.203  696 6.644  4.308  
atscl 23,409 0.751  0.432  696 0.685  0.465  
onvac 33,053 0.302  0.459  1,000 0.240  0.427  
WhouseworkII 22,458 2.480  1.176  668 2.434  1.087  
HhouseworkII 16,760 1.565  0.842  458 1.563  0.838  
lhhincomesqrpc 23,409 9.826  0.698  696 9.854  0.660  
helper 33,053 0.015  0.121  1,000 0.016  0.126  
singleparent 33,053 0.066  0.248  1,000 0.096  0.295  
urban 33,053 0.254  0.435  1,000 0.264  0.441  
underseven 33,053 0.223  0.416  1,000 0.170  0.376  
freezer 32,859 0.329  0.470  996 0.309  0.462  
washing 32,859 0.137  0.344  996 0.153  0.360  
gascooker 32,859 0.460  0.498  996 0.456  0.498  
vacuum 32,859 0.719  0.449  996 0.703  0.457  
microwave 32,859 0.014  0.117  996 0.010  0.100  
areapc 32,859 0.023  0.151  996 0.022  0.147  
Descriptions of variables as in Table 1. In two-child families, children of household heads are less than 21 years 
of age, of single marital status, and with the same family name as the only sibling. In the twin data, children of 
household heads have single marital status and the same family name and year and month of birth as the only 
other sibling residing in the household. 
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Table 3 Probability and duration of being involved in housework by relationship with 
household head 
 
 All family members Children of household heads 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Time Select Time Select 
sex 0.606*** 0.600*** 0.293*** 0.411*** 
 (0.00760) (0.00948) (0.0208) (0.0144) 
Head’s spouse  0.468***   
  (0.0169)   
Head’s children  –0.897***   
  (0.0158)   
Head’s parents  –2.005***   
  (0.0331)   
Head’s grandparents  –2.668***   
  (0.133)   
Head’s grandchildren  –1.753***   
  (0.0305)   
Other relations to the head  –0.324***   
  (0.0242)   
Observations 160,616 160,616 54,937 54,937 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). All selected children in (3) and (4) 
have single marital status. Results for other variables not reported but always included in estimations, including 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 in both select stage and outcome stage, 𝑒𝑑𝑢, 𝑙ℎℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑝𝑐, ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟, and 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 in select stage, and 
workhour (working hours) in outcome stage. 
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Table 4 Probability and duration of being involved in housework by children of household heads in one- and two-child families and twin data 
 
Head’s children One-child families  Two-child families  Twins 
 No age limit Age < 21 years No age limit Age < 21 years No age limit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables Time Select Time Select Time Select Time Select Time Select 
sex 0.299*** 0.419*** 0.240*** 0.298*** 0.191*** 0.295*** 0.161*** 0.249*** 0.116 0.437*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0428) (0.0439) (0.0536) (0.0188) (0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0231) (0.116) (0.134) 
edu –0.00979 0.0606*** –0.000229 0.108*** –0.00846** 0.0814*** –0.0308*** 0.107*** –0.0241 0.0463** 
 (0.00600) (0.00575) (0.0108) (0.00802) (0.00402) (0.00307) (0.00754) (0.00362) (0.0197) (0.0192) 
atscl  –0.512***  –0.442***  –0.264***  –0.241***  –0.480** 
  (0.0497)  (0.0690)  (0.0290)  (0.0362)  (0.197) 
onvac  0.300***  0.250***  0.127***  0.102***  0.448*** 
  (0.0567)  (0.0633)  (0.0247)  (0.0260)  (0.156) 
lhhincomesqrpc  –0.138***  –0.120**  –0.112***  –0.100***  0.290* 
  (0.0394)  (0.0526)  (0.0204)  (0.0226)  (0.150) 
underseven  –1.314***  –0.983***  –0.767***  –0.623***  –6.270*** 
  (0.253)  (0.256)  (0.110)  (0.109)  (0.306) 
age 0.0101***  0.0160*  0.0161***  0.0465***  0.0220*  
 (0.00266)  (0.00908)  (0.00251)  (0.00693)  (0.0117)  
WhouseworkII 0.113***  0.123***  0.0952***  0.104***  0.0961  
 (0.0205)  (0.0268)  (0.0106)  (0.0119)  (0.0614)  
HhouseworkII 0.235***  0.221***  0.209***  0.198***  0.227***  
 (0.0304)  (0.0377)  (0.0166)  (0.0177)  (0.0735)  
Observations 5,346 5,346 3,295 3,295 19,985 19,985 16,627 16,627 485 485 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). Results for other variables not reported but always included in estimations, including ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟, 
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 in the select stage, household appliances (freezer, washing machine, gas cooker, rice cooker, vacuum cleaner and microwave oven, and living space 
per capita) in both select and outcome stages. 
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Table 5 Interaction between child gender and housework load by parent of the same gender 
 
Head’s children One-child families  Two-child families  Twins  
 No age limit Age < 21 years No age limit Age < 21 years  No age limit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables Time Select Time Select Time Select Time Select Time Select 
sex 0.0916 0.419*** 0.0771 0.298*** 0.0717 0.295*** 0.0915 0.249*** –0.525 0.437*** 
 (0.109) (0.0428) (0.139) (0.0536) (0.0592) (0.0210) (0.0662) (0.0231) (0.399) (0.134) 
WhouseworkII 0.0805***  0.0853**  0.0742***  0.0919***  –0.110  
 (0.0255)  (0.0340)  (0.0134)  (0.0159)  (0.123)  
HhouseworkII 0.240***  0.204***  0.210***  0.200***  0.141*  
 (0.0432)  (0.0484)  (0.0243)  (0.0253)  (0.0794)  
BHhouseworkII –0.00886  0.0331  –0.00254  –0.00379  0.105  
 (0.0594)  (0.0739)  (0.0332)  (0.0353)  (0.0739)  
GWhouseworkII 0.0797*  0.0885  0.0481**  0.0270  0.298**  
 (0.0412)  (0.0548)  (0.0209)  (0.0234)  (0.150)  
Observations 5,346 5,346 3,295 3,295 19,985 19,985 16,627 16,627 485 485 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). Results for other variables not reported but always included in estimations, including 𝑎𝑔𝑒 in 
outcome stage, 𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑙, 𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑐, 𝑙ℎℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑝𝑐, ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟, 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 and 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 in select stage, household appliances (freezer, washing machine, gas 
cooker, rice cooker, vacuum cleaner and microwave oven), education and living space per capita in both select and outcome stages.  
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Table 6 Probability and duration of being involved in housework by sex composition and 
birth order of children of household heads in two-child families 
 
Head’s children No age limit Age < 21 years 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Time Select Time Select 
egirlinGG 0.207*** 0.352*** 0.185*** 0.301*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0446) (0.0400) (0.0488) 
ygirlinGG 0.0580 0.209*** 0.0513 0.202*** 
 (0.0379) (0.0494) (0.0394) (0.0521) 
girlinGB 0.214*** 0.400*** 0.195*** 0.375*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0386) (0.0359) (0.0425) 
girlinBG 0.238*** 0.396*** 0.220*** 0.365*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0408) (0.0389) (0.0435) 
boyinBG 0.0269 0.129*** 0.0318 0.164*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0383) (0.0329) (0.0427) 
boyinGB 0.0272 0.0322 0.0390 0.00374 
 (0.0356) (0.0407) (0.0379) (0.0435) 
eboyinBB –0.00983 0.0860** 0.0123 0.147*** 
 (0.0337) (0.0376) (0.0384) (0.0420) 
Observations 19,985 19,985 16,627 16,627 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). Results for other control variables 
not reported but always included in estimations, including age, 𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝐼, and 𝐻ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝐼  in 
outcome stage, 𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑙 , 𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑐 , 𝑙ℎℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑝𝑐 , ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟 , 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛  and 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛  in 
select stage, household appliances (freezer, washing machine, gas cooker, rice cooker, vacuum cleaner and 
microwave oven), education and living space per capita in both select and outcome stages. 
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Table 7 Bivariate probit estimation for probability of undertaking housework by birth order 
among children of household heads in two-child families 
 
Head’s children No age limit Age < 21 years 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Select1 Select2 Select1 Select2 
sex1 0.416*** –0.0518* 0.302*** –0.0697** 
 (0.0277) (0.0284) (0.0329) (0.0346) 
age1 –0.0120** –0.0184*** –0.0177 0.00572 
 (0.00537) (0.00563) (0.0122) (0.0133) 
edu1 0.0303*** 0.00970 0.0561*** –0.000221 
 (0.00587) (0.00613) (0.0110) (0.0115) 
atscl1 –0.426*** 0.0163 –0.427*** –0.00250 
 (0.0404) (0.0404) (0.0546) (0.0546) 
onvac1 0.278*** –0.207*** 0.294*** –0.0521 
 (0.0477) (0.0489) (0.0576) (0.0601) 
underseven1 –5.828*** –4.743*** –6.456*** –4.809*** 
 (0.149) (0.194) (0.143) (0.210) 
sex2 –0.00453 0.383*** –0.0217 0.310*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0281) (0.0328) (0.0347) 
age2 0.0180** 0.0313*** 0.0122 0.107*** 
 (0.00720) (0.00725) (0.0172) (0.0180) 
edu2 –0.0211*** 0.0777*** –0.00799 0.0609*** 
 (0.00717) (0.00719) (0.0165) (0.0167) 
atscl2 0.299*** –0.287*** 0.407*** 0.0147 
 (0.0464) (0.0474) (0.0707) (0.0748) 
onvac2 –0.101** 0.226*** –0.165*** 0.0803 
 (0.0414) (0.0415) (0.0529) (0.0536) 
underseven2 –0.428*** –0.638*** –0.378*** –0.232* 
 (0.0696) (0.136) (0.0725) (0.141) 
Observations 10,691 10,691 7,493 7,493 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). Results for other control variables 
not reported but always included in estimations, including 𝑙ℎℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑝𝑐, ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟, 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛, 
living space per capita and household appliances (freezer, washing machine, gas cooker, rice cooker, vacuum 
cleaner and microwave oven). 
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Table 8 SUR for time spent on housework by birth order among children of household heads 
in two-child families 
 
Head’s children No age limit Age < 21 years 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Time1 Time2 Time1 Time2 
sex1 0.237*** –0.0712*** 0.177*** –0.0537* 
 (0.0330) (0.0268) (0.0398) (0.0301) 
age1 0.00469 0.000185 0.0164 0.00495 
 (0.00712) (0.00578) (0.0150) (0.0114) 
edu1 –0.00532 –0.00455 0.000593 –0.00568 
 (0.00751) (0.00610) (0.0130) (0.00984) 
atscl1 –0.178*** –0.124*** –0.232*** –0.0949* 
 (0.0486) (0.0395) (0.0652) (0.0492) 
onvac1 –0.0183 0.104** 0.0388 0.0974* 
 (0.0597) (0.0484) (0.0718) (0.0543) 
sex2 –0.0389 0.153*** –0.0870** 0.0740** 
 (0.0325) (0.0264) (0.0395) (0.0299) 
age2 –0.0161* 0.00230 –0.0137 0.0142 
 (0.00969) (0.00787) (0.0194) (0.0147) 
edu2 0.00312 0.0177** –0.00529 0.0139 
 (0.00976) (0.00793) (0.0182) (0.0138) 
atscl2 –0.111** –0.130*** –0.110 –0.130** 
 (0.0566) (0.0459) (0.0852) (0.0644) 
onvac2 0.0866* –0.0226 0.0530 –0.0107 
 (0.0504) (0.0409) (0.0636) (0.0481) 
Observations 2,487 2,487 1,745 1,745 
R-squared 0.119 0.127 0.125 0.124 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). Results for other variables not 
reported but always included in estimations, including 𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝐼, 𝐻ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝐼, ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟, 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛, 
living space per capita and household appliances (freezer, washing machine, gas cooker, rice cooker, vacuum 
cleaner and microwave oven). 
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Table 9 First-difference analysis for time spent on housework for twins 
 
Head’s children 
Twins 
(pooled) 
Twins in two-child 
families 
Twins 
(pooled) 
Twins in two-child 
families 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables dhousework dhousework dhousework dhousework 
samesex 0.238* 0.0556 0.218 0.0894 
 (0.124) (0.179) (0.158) (0.130) 
datscl –0.430 2*** –0.754 2.276*** 
 (0.643) (0.0222) (0.613) (0.288) 
donvac 0.158 –2.389*** 0.428 –2.727*** 
 (0.665) (0.307) (0.611) (0.311) 
lhhincomesqrpc   0.0859 0.0925 
   (0.0885) (0.0716) 
helper   –1.352 0.0955 
   (1.127) (0.134) 
singleparent   –0.264** –0.103 
   (0.133) (0.188) 
urban   0.0954 –0.0576 
   (0.0760) (0.0680) 
freezer   –0.0825 0.114 
   (0.105) (0.103) 
washing   0.302 –0.167 
   (0.191) (0.114) 
gascooker   –0.0402 0.102 
   (0.0927) (0.0961) 
ricecooker   –0.303** –0.266** 
   (0.137) (0.110) 
microwave   –0.467* –0.0416 
   (0.262) (0.198) 
areapc   0.0120 –0.000684 
   (0.00796) (0.00645) 
Constant –0.227** –0.0556 –0.973 –0.816 
 (0.114) (0.179) (0.845) (0.655) 
Observations 133 63 132 62 
R-squared 0.079 0.530 0.271 0.633 
Adj R-squared 0.0571 0.5056 0.1905 0.5341 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). 
 
 
 
